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What an Originalist Would Understand 
“Corruption” to Mean 
Lawrence Lessig* 
As important as “that” is “how.” It is commonplace to say of 
the United States Congress that it is “corrupt.” But it is critical, if we 
are to reform that corrupt institution, to say how it is corrupt. In what 
sense? According to what meaning? For what reasons? 
For the United States Congress is not corrupt in any traditional 
(albeit modern) sense of the term. Congress is not filled with 
criminals. Its members are not seeking bribes or using their official 
influence for private gain. In this sense, as Dennis Thompson offers, 
our Congress is likely the least corrupt Congress in the history of that 
institution.
1  These are not bad souls bending the public weal to 
private ends. The institution is not corrupt because it is filled with a 
bunch of corrupt individuals. 
Instead Congress is corrupt at the level of the institution. We 
can presume the individuals within the institution are innocent; the 
economy of influence that they have allowed to evolve is not. 
 
    Copyright © 2014 Lawrence Lessig, licensed CC BY. 
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Members of Congress, of course, are ultimately responsible for the 
influence they have allowed to  evolve. But there is a distinction 
between being responsible and being corrupt: the bartender may well 
be responsible for the alcoholic’s accident; that doesn’t make her a 
drunk. 
And that is the objective of this short Essay: to see how an 
institution can be corrupt even if its members are not. I base the 
argument on the Brennan Center’s Jorde Symposium lecture that I 
had the honor of presenting at Berkeley Law in January of 2013. But 
lectures are not (or should not be) essays. So while this Essay draws 
from that lecture, it reaches beyond it. In particular, it is enriched by 
the generous and careful criticism of election law maven Rick Hasen. 
I take the opportunity in this Essay  to also reply to him more 
carefully.
2 
It is my claim that this “corruption”—what I call “dependence 
corruption”—should be easy for an originalist to see. Indeed, as this 
Essay will insist, only a non-originalist could reject it. That fact, if 
correct, makes the views of the originalists on the Supreme Court 
about the scope of the term “corruption” all the more puzzling, even 
as it also makes traditional reformers uncomfortable. 
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I. 
LESTERLAND 
The way to see how our Congress is corrupt is through an allegory. This is 
the allegory of Lesterland.
3 
 
2. Rick Hasen first reviewed my book in the Harvard Law Review. Richard L. Hasen, Fixing 
Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550 (2012) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW 
MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT  (2011)). I replied to that piece in the 
Harvard Law Review Forum. Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61 
(2012). Hasen then replied in a working paper that will be published in the respected Election Law 
Journal. Richard L. Hasen, Is ‘Dependence Corruption’ Distinct from a Political Equality Argument 
for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig (U.C. Irvine Law Sch., Research Paper No. 
2013-94), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220851. But as that journal does not embrace open 
access practices, I have channeled my response here.  
3. I introduced this idea in a TED talk and in an accompanying book. Lawrence Lessig, We the 
People, and the Republic We Must Reclaim, Address at TED Conference (Feb. 27, 2013) (video 
available at http://bit.ly/Lesterland); LAWRENCE LESSIG, LESTERLAND (2013). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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Imagine Lesterland as a nation much like the United States. It has a 
population as large as the United States (in 2010). And among its citizens, 
imagine there are just as many people named Lester as there are “Lesters” in 
the United States—about 144,000 out of 311 million, or about 0.05 percent 
named “Lester.” 
“Lesters” in Lesterland have a very special power. In every Lesterland 
election cycle, there are two elections. One is a general election, in which all 
citizens get to vote. The other is a “Lester election,” in which only Lesters get 
to vote. 
But here’s the catch: To be allowed to run in the general election, you 
must do extremely well in the Lester election. You don’t necessarily have to 
win. But you must do extremely well. 
Democracy in Lesterland is thus a two-step process. Candidates must first 
clear the Lester-linked hurdle before they can clear the people-linked hurdle. 
Candidates are thus dependent upon the Lesters even though they are also 
dependent upon “the People.” 
So conceived, there are two obvious facts to remark about the democracy 
of Lesterland. First, as the Supreme Court said in Citizens United v. FEC, the 
“people [of Lesterland] have the ultimate influence over elected officials.”
4 The 
influence is ultimate even if not exclusive, for there is a general election, and 
the people get to vote in that general election. 
Second, despite that ultimate influence, it’s clear that this dependence 
upon the Lester election will produce a subtle, understated, perhaps 
camouflaged bending to keep the Lesters happy. That bending is how this 
alternative influence manifests itself. Present, but not too obvious; salient, but 
not exclusive. 
Lesterland draws into focus the corruption of America’s Congress today. 
Because in a structurally, and hence constitutionally, significant way, the 
United States is Lesterland. The United States is Lesterland, first, in that it, too, 
effectively has two distinct elections. One election is discrete—call it the 
“voting election.” It happens on a particular day (or a small range of dates), 
twice in an election cycle. All “voters” are permitted to participate in that 
election. And “voters” include any citizen eighteen and older who has properly 
registered to vote. 
The other election is continuous—call it the “money election.” It happens 
throughout an election cycle. Any citizen (regardless of age) is permitted to 
participate in that money election. If contributions are below $200, that 
participation can be anonymous. If contributions are $200 and above (capped at 
$2,600 per election per candidate), that participation must be public. 
Thus the first link to Lesterland is that we effectively have two elections. 
The second link is the nature of the connection between those two elections: as 
 
4. 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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in Lesterland, to be allowed to run in the voting election (like the general 
election in Lesterland) one has to do extremely well in the money election (like 
the Lester election in Lesterland). A candidate doesn’t necessarily have to win 
the money election, but she must do extremely well. In the 2012 election cycle, 
84 percent of the House candidates and 67 percent of the Senate candidates 
with more money than their opponents won. On average, winning Senate 
candidates raised $10.4 million; losing candidates raised only $7.7 million. On 
average, winning House candidates raised $1.6 million; losing candidates 
raised just $0.774 million.
5 
Thus in effect, the money election is a qualifying election in the United 
States, similar to the way the Lester election is a qualifying election in 
Lesterland. And as in Lesterland, that qualifying election thus qualifies the 
democracy in USA-land in two similar ways: First, as in Lesterland, we can say 
that citizens in USA-land, as the Supreme Court promised in Citizens United v. 
FEC, “have the ultimate influence over elected officials.”
6 Ultimate influence, 
even if not primary or exclusive influence. Second, as in Lesterland, that 
ultimate influence notwithstanding, the immediate influence of the money 
election produces a subtle, perhaps camouflaged bending to keep the funders in 
the money elections happy.
7 Candidates for Congress spend anywhere between 
30 percent and 70 percent of their time raising money in the money election.
8 
For hours every day, members live within a kind of “funders box,” analogous 
to a “Skinner box,” the device B.F. Skinner used to condition rats and pigeons. 
Living life in that funders box teaches members which buttons to push in order 
to trigger the funding that they need. Over time, no doubt, members get good at 
speaking in a way that inspires that essential funding. They learn to talk about 
the issues the funders care about; they spend very little time talking about the 
issues most Americans care about. That learning is consistent with the pattern 
of legislation that many scholars have described.
9 
Finally—and the whole reason I have used “Lester” as the moniker for my 
allegory—the United States is Lesterland in the sense that the relevant number 
 
5. BLAIR  BOWIE,  U.S.  PIRG  EDUC.  FUND  &  ADAM  LIOZ,  DĒMOS,  BILLION-DOLLAR 
DEMOCRACY: THE UNPRECEDENTED ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 18 (2013), available 
at  http://www.demos.org/publication/billion-dollar-democracy-unprecedented-role-money-2012 
-elections.  
6. 558 U.S. at 360. 
7. Assuming the “affluent” are “the funders,” the best documentation of this bending is the 
work of Martin Gilens,  AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE:  ECONOMIC  INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA (2012), and Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy 
and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51 (2013). 
8. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN 
TO STOP IT 138 n.43 (2011). 
9. See  GILENS,  supra  note  7;  JACOB  S.  HACKER  &  PAUL  PIERSON,  WINNER-TAKE-ALL 
POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE 
CLASS (2010). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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of funders is just as few (indeed, likely fewer) as the number of Lesters in 
Lesterland. 
Here are the statistics for 2010:
10 In the two years that comprised the 2010 
election cycle, 0.26 percent of Americans gave $200 or more to any 
congressional candidate. That’s 809,229 Americans—one-quarter of one 
percent of us. 0.05 percent of Americans gave the maximum amount to any 
congressional candidate—that’s one-twentieth of one percent, or one person in 
2,000, or about 144,000 Americans. 0.01 percent—the one percent of the one 
percent—gave $10,000 or more to any combination  of federal candidates. 
0.00024 percent—roughly 750 Americans—gave $100,000 or more to any 
combination of federal candidates. And though my focus in this Essay  is 
Congress, in the 2012 presidential election 0.000032 percent—or 99 
Americans—provided 60 percent of the individual Super PAC money spent 
throughout that cycle.
11 
So along this range—$200+  (0.26 percent), $2,400 (0.05 percent), 
$10,000 (0.01 percent) or $100,000 (0.00024 percent)—it’s hard to believe that 
someone giving just $200 is a “relevant funder.” It’s easy to believe that 
someone giving $100,000 is a “relevant funder.” But, conservatively, it is 
certainly fair to believe that a “relevant funder” is someone giving at least the 
maximum amount to at least one campaign. 
So, at most, about 150,000 Americans, or 0.05 percent of us, are the 
“relevant funders” of America’s elections. Or again, there are just as few 
relevant “funders” in the United States as there are people named “Lester” in 
Lesterland. “The funders” in the United States are the “Lesters” in Lesterland. 
II. 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, “LESTERLAND” WOULD BE A 
“CORRUPTION” 
The allegory of Lesterland is entertaining, but I mean it to be instructive. 
Through it we can see just why the way we fund elections today is 
“corruption.” Not “corruption” in a metaphorical sense, but in a sense the 
Framers of our Constitution would have understood precisely. In a single line: 
the way we fund elections has created a dependency that conflicts with the 
dependency intended by the Constitution. That conflict is a corruption.
12 
 
10. I am relying upon 2010 because that is the last congressional cycle we have data for. The 
Center for Responsive Politics has similar statistics for 2012, but it is not possible to isolate precisely 
the presidential from congressional funder influence, at least when counting PAC contributions.  
11. In the TED talk, I was relying upon older data. The updated number—99 Americans—is 
calculated in BOWIE & LIOZ, supra note 5, at 10. 
12. Throughout this Essay, I draw especially upon both the works of Zachary Brugman and 
Zephyr Teachout. See Zachary Seth Brugman, The Bipartisan Promise of 1776: The Republican Form 
and Its Manner of Election 31 n.140 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192705; Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption  Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). Teachout maps a rich understanding of the Framers’ conception of 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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To modern ears, “conflicting  dependencies” doesn’t sound like 
“corruption.” But that’s because we moderns typically predicate the term 
“corruption” on individuals. The Framers, by contrast, had a richer 
understanding of this condemnatory term. As Lisa Hill describes, 
Until the end of  the eighteenth century, “corruption” had a much 
broader meaning than it does today; it referred “less to the actions of 
individuals” than to the general moral health of the body politic judged 
according to “distributions of wealth and power, relationships between 
leaders and followers, the source of power and the moral right of rulers 
to rule.”
13 
Thus, in the Framers’ language, whole peoples, or societies could be 
corrupt—Rome, for example. Or institutions could be corrupt—Parliament, for 
example, corrupted by the king. Or individuals could be corrupt—as several 
Founders saw many throughout Britain to be.
14  The point is not that 
“corruption” didn’t include our modern sense of individual corruption—the 
“abuse of public office for private gain.”
15  It did. But it  also included a 
collective sense—the corruption of an institution, or a people, and not just a 
person. 
This is the sense of “corruption” to which I refer in this Essay. At the level 
of the institution, the structure of incentives that we have allowed to evolve has 
corrupted our Congress. The problem, as Adam Smith remarked of corruption 
in Britain, is “more of a systemic problem.”
16 It is seen by “focusing almost 
exclusively on its legalized and normal forms.”
17 This isn’t properly described 
as a “broader” sense of corruption than the modern sense. It’s simply a different 
 
corruption. Brugman has tied that understanding explicitly to the notion of conflicting dependency. 
Teachout’s work has been enormously influential in a very short time, cited extensively by the dissent 
in Citizens United. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
It has also been criticized by Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180 
(2013). Tillman’s primary criticism of Teachout is that she reads “Person holding any Office of Profit 
or Trust” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause to include elected representatives. Tillman does not. That, 
Tillman asserts, weakens Teachout’s argument for the existence of such an “anti-corruption principle.” 
Even if so weakened, however, Tillman agrees that the Constitution “embodies a structural anti-
corruption principle.” Id. at 180. And even if so weakened, Tillman’s carefully argued point would not 
weaken the argument for which I have offered it here: My claim is simply that this structural principle 
“embodied” in the Constitution should give Congress the grounds upon which to further protect that 
principle. However weak or strong, the anti-corruption principle should at least rebuff judicial efforts 
to negate its salience.  
13. Lisa Hill, Adam Smith and the Theme of Corruption, 68 REV. OF POL. 636, 636–37 (2006). 
14. Patrick Henry, Speech on the Expediency of Adopting the Federal Constitution (June 7, 
1788), in 1 ELOQUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 178, 223 (E.B. Williston ed., 1827) (“Look at Britain; 
see there the bolts and bars of power; see bribery and corruption defiling the fairest fabric that ever 
human nature reared.”) (cited in Teachout, supra note 12, at 349). 
15. Hill, supra note 13, at 639. 
16. Id. at 637. 
17. Id. at 650. 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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sense. It isn’t produced by stretching a “narrow” sense to fit something more. It 
instead identifies a different dynamic, operating at a different level. 
These levels may be linked, but not necessarily. An institution can be 
corrupt even if every individual within it is not. Thus, to say that Congress is 
corrupt is not necessarily to say that any member of Congress is also corrupt. 
They may be, or they may not be; the two concepts are distinct. The proof of 
one does not entail the proof of the other. 
The particular flavor of this original sense of corruption that I allege here 
is constituted by an improper dependence. As I will establish below, Congress 
was intended to be “dependent on the people alone.” It has become dependent 
upon an additional dependence, “the funders” of campaigns. Because of who 
“the funders” are, this additional dependence is a conflicting dependence, and 
that conflict constitutes the “corruption.” 
This sense of corruption, as constituted by “improper dependence,” was 
perfectly familiar to the Framers. In their view, for example, the British 
Parliament was corrupt. Not (just) in the sense that there were members of 
Parliament who were on the take—no doubt there were—but rather, in the 
sense that the institution of Parliament was “corrupt.” It was corrupt not 
because of those individuals, but instead because many within it were 
dependent upon the king. The king could appoint members of Parliament to 
offices; the king also could effectively select the members from “rotten 
boroughs” (districts with tiny populations that the king could control).
18 Those 
“placemen,” as Alexander Hamilton described, were “the true source of the 
corruption which has so long excited the severe animadversion of zealous 
politicians and patriots.”
19 Their presence rendered the institution “corrupt,” 
even though not every member of Parliament was so influenced. 
The Framers displayed the same understanding of the meaning of 
“corruption” in their deliberations about the manner by which the President 
would be selected. The President was to be dependent “on the people,” though 
indirectly through the Electoral College. Obviously, and as the election of 1800 
would soon demonstrate, the Electoral College could tie. The Senate was 
initially proposed as the institution to resolve any tie in the College. But that 
idea was quickly rejected because of the fear that it would “corrupt” the 
President. As Zachery Brugman nicely summarizes, 
“Referring the appointment to the Senate lays a certain foundation for 
corruption & aristocracy,” noted Hu Williamson from North Carolina. 
“The aristocratic complexion proceeds from the change in the mode of 
appointing the President which makes him dependent on the Senate.” 
George Mason similarly asserted that this dependence on the Senate—
while there was simultaneous (indirect) dependence on the People—
 
18. Teachout, supra note 12, at 346–72. 
19. Alexander Hamilton, Debate in New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788) (cited in 
Brugman, supra note 12, at 31 n.140). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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would “subvert the Constitution.” He would, “prefer the Government 
of Prussia to one which will put all power into the hands of seven or 
eight men, and fix an Aristocracy worse than absolute monarchy.” 
James Wilson agreed, because of his “dependence on them,” the 
Senate, “the President will not be the man of the people as he ought to 
be,” he would be a “Minion of the Senate.” The dependent relationship 
posed, “a dangerous tendency to aristocracy.” Alexander Hamilton and 
Edmond Randolph shared similar sentiments.
20 
Once again, the concern was that a conflicting dependence of the 
President—upon the Senate, which since selected by the state legislature, was 
an influence different from “the people,” and the College, more directly 
representative of “the people”—would “corrupt” him. Even though such 
dependence was contingent and unlikely (there have been few ties in the 
Electoral College in  the 225 years of the Republic), it still was deemed a 
corruption. That corruption was constituted by a conflicting dependence. The 
mere possibility that the Senate would break a tie meant “the President will not 
be the man of the people.”
21 
It is with this conception of “corruption” in mind that we can see why our 
current Congress is “corrupt.” For the Framers, Congress was also to have an 
intended dependence.
22 That dependence was to be, as James Madison wrote in 
The Federalist No. 52, “on the people.” The House, Madison wrote, 
should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy 
with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy 
by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.
23 
“[D]ue dependence on the people,” as Hamilton wrote, produces “the 
requisites to safety, in a republican sense.”
24 That “due dependence” was to be 
secured through elections “FREELY by the WHOLE BODY of the people, 
every SECOND YEAR.”
25  Through such elections, the House would be 
“dependent on the people.” 
But Madison’s condition was even stricter: the House, he wrote, was to be 
dependent “on the people alone.”
26 The “alone” bit was to insist that the House, 
unlike the Senate, was not also to be dependent upon the States. The States 
already had their interests secured through the Senate; the House was to secure 
the interests of “the People.” Not, as Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 57, 
“some people[,]” but instead “the great body of the people in the United 
 
20. Brugman, supra note 12, at 33. 
21. Id.  (quoting 2 THE  RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL  CONVENTION OF 1787,  at 524 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911). 
22. Technically, Madison was speaking of the House. The Senate was differently dependent, 
since senators were selected by state legislatures. But after the 17th Amendment, I am assuming the 
principles that did apply before to the House alone now apply generally to both the House and Senate.  
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 23, at 463–64 (Alexander Hamilton). 
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 23, at 260 (James Madison). 
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 23, at 326 (James Madison). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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States.” And critically, as Madison wrote, “Not the rich more than the poor.”
27 
As Zach Brugman summarizes their views, “an additional relationship of 
dependence by a representative to attain office, beyond the dependence on the 
People, epitomizes corruption—and results in aristocracy.”
28 
In the Framers’ view, then, an institution must avoid an improper 
dependence to avoid corruption. And as the story about the President becoming 
dependent upon the Senate shows, even the mere possibility of a systemic 
dependence upon an influence that is inconsistent with the intended dependence 
was enough to characterize that institution as “corrupt.” Independent of the 
moral virtues of the people occupying the relevant office, in other words, the 
office itself would be “corrupt” if the influences on that office were 
inconsistent with dependence intended by the Constitution. The Framers were 
Newtonians. They were building a machine that would be pulled by a clear 
balance of gravities. Allowing the wrong body to interfere with those intended 
gravities was, in their view, “corruption.” 
From this perspective, the anti-corruption challenge was not how to 
ensure that criminals stayed away from Congress; the challenge was how to 
secure the influences most likely to align the institution to its proper ends by 
protecting it from improper dependence. The “most likely” qualification is 
unavoidable. Again, we are talking about tendencies, not deductive logic. Like 
a parent raising a child, or a tourist packing for a trip, we look ahead to the 
likely influences to be encountered, and protect against them. 
Sometimes that protection is enough to prevent corruption. Sometimes it 
is not. Thinking in this way, the spouse of an alcoholic might keep alcohol out 
of the house. The purpose of that exclusion is to avoid the distraction of that 
dependence from drawing the alcoholic away from her purpose. So protected, 
she is more likely to get up in the morning, get dressed, and go off to work than 
she would be if the temptation of alcohol were easily available. She is more 
likely to do those things, but it is not certain. Many things can take her astray. 
The concern about the conditions under which she lives is thus distinct from 
how she in fact lives. They are related, but not determinative. 
Central to this conception of “corruption” is the notion of “the People,” 
for unless we have a clear sense of “the People,” we have no way to know 
whether a conflicting dependency has developed. 
But for us, the Framers’ conception of “the People” is not helpful. It is 
hard for us to view those who held political power at the framing—white, male, 
property owners—as “the People.” If anything, that design seems to support the 
notion that it was to be the rich alone who would exercise political power in 
America—much like Lesterland. 
 
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 23, at 351 (James Madison). 
28. Brugman, supra note 12, at 33. 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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Yet such a view of the Framers’ design is both crude and anachronistic. 
The Framers limited the franchise to property owners. But 90 percent of white 
male Americans were property owners at the founding.
29 And those who were 
not were excluded from the franchise, not to reinforce aristocracy, but to resist 
it. The Framers feared that if the non-propertied could vote, the rich would 
have a simple way to buy more influence. To protect against that form of 
corruption, the franchise was secured to those who were not dependent upon 
others—property owners.
30  
Likewise, with the exclusion of those who were not “white” and “male.” 
No doubt the Framers excluded people who we rightly believe should have 
been included as citizens and granted the franchise. They excluded slaves (they 
had  slaves!) and except in a few cases, Africans generally. They excluded 
women. The first exclusion was simple (and tragic) racism; the second, sexism. 
Both are moral stains on a tradition that we continue to honor. None should 
belittle the significance of those stains. 
But though we rightly “deprecat[e] the closed-mindedness of our 
forebears,”
31 we should at least see the nature of that second exclusion, and 
recognize the structural similarity with an exclusion of our own. The Framers, 
like us, believed in “virtual  representation.” They believed then that males 
would virtually represent females and children. We believe now that males and 
females will virtually represent children. We today believe that they were 
wrong to cast the net of virtual representation as broadly as they did. There are 
some today who believe we are wrong to cast the net of virtual representation 
as broadly as we do. But the weakness of the justifications for the scope of their 
net for virtual representation has nothing to do with supporting aristocracy. 
Indeed, to the contrary. The Framers were no doubt oblivious to race 
equality and sex equality, but they certainly understood class. As Brugman 
quite nicely frames it, “we separated from an aristocracy as well as a 
monarchy.”
32 That explains the Constitution’s explicit ban on nobility. It also 
shows why it was “essential,” as Madison described it, “to such a [Republic] 
that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable 
proportion, or a favored class of it.”
33 
They had a conception of “the People.” It was distinct from “the States,” 
or “the Law,” or the French king for that matter. They intended the House to be 
exclusively dependent upon “the People.” And they crafted their Constitution 
to achieve that exclusive dependence. 
Within the Republic they crafted, it is certainly possible there would still 
be corrupt individuals: people using their power to trade influence for personal 
 
29. See, e.g., id. at 40. 
30. See id. at 41 and sources cited thereon. 
31. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32. Brugman, supra note 12, at 7. 
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 23, at 241 (James Madison). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
2014]  AN ORIGINALIST UNDERSTANDING OF “CORRUPTION”  11 
wealth. Such souls were not their constitutional concern. Instead, within the 
Republic they were crafting, their overwhelming objective was to avoid a 
corruption of a different order. God would deal with the likes of Randy “Duke” 
Cunningham;
34  they were concerned with avoiding the corruption of the 
institutions that they designed. 
Put more directly, their primary sense of “corruption” would have been 
the “corruption of improper dependence.” Next to that corruption, anything else 
was a distant second.
35 
It is this fact that makes the current Supreme Court’s jurisprudence about 
“corruption” so weird. I don’t believe the Court has yet closed the door to this 
more historically accurate understanding of the Framers’ purpose. But relative 
to that original understanding, the Court’s rhetoric is quite clumsy. No doubt, 
there is no problem with recognizing quid  pro quo corruption as the sort 
Congress has a legitimate and compelling reason to remedy.
36 But language 
throughout the Court’s opinions makes it seem that the Court believes quid pro 
quo “corruption” is the only constitutionally relevant sense of the word.
37 
Only a non-originalist could embrace that position. The Framers of our 
Constitution may well have been worried about quid pro quo corruption. But 
they were unquestionably and primarily worried about “dependence 
corruption.” If Congress has the power to remedy the former, it certainly has 
the power to address the latter. 
III. 
WHAT “DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION” IS NOT 
Professor Rick Hasen rejects the idea that “dependence corruption” is a 
constitutionally cognizable kind of “corruption.”
38  Instead, in his view, 
“dependence corruption” is just an equality argument in “corruption” drag. 
Hasen’s a pretty good authority for that kind of disrobing: the Supreme 
Court recognized his claim about the “different type of corruption” (as the 
Supreme Court had described it) in  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
 
34. The government charged that Congressman Cunningham took over $2.4 million in 
exchange for securing contracts from the Department of Defense. In 2005, he pleaded guilty, and was 
sentenced to eight years and four months in prison. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 226. 
35. See Teachout, supra note 12, at 348–49. 
36. The quid pro quo could be for a personal benefit or a political benefit. The former is 
ordinarily the domain of bribery regulation, and scholars such as David Strauss see this distinction as 
fundamental. In Strauss’s view, a quid pro quo for a political benefit is a problem only because of 
inequality, and concern for the functioning of the political system. David A. Strauss, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (1994). But as the Court 
does not distinguish between the personal and the political, I collapse the distinction here as well.  
37. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 447 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (challenging the 
majority’s narrow, quid pro quo view of corruption). 
38. See Hasen, Is ‘Dependence Corruption’ Distinct, supra note 2, at 10–16.  01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
12  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  102:1 
Commerce.
39  Hasen had argued that Austin’s “corruption” was in fact not 
“corruption” at all.
40 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressly agreed 
with him: As the Court said, the desire to address “the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth . . . accumulated with the help of the 
corporate form [and with] little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas” was not a desire to end “corruption.”
41 It was 
instead a desire to level the playing field. That desire, the Court held, following 
Hasen, was not a constitutionally permissible basis for restricting political 
speech. 
Hasen and the Court were right to see Austin’s “corruption” as an 
argument grounded in equality. And the Court, following Robert Post,
42 was 
right to reject equality as a compelling interest sufficient to justify the 
suppression of political speech. But it is just a confusion to equate the equality 
idea in Austin  with “dependence corruption.” “Dependence corruption” is 
distinct from equality, as I will show here. It is instead, as the last Part 
established, precisely the sort of “corruption” the Framers were concerned to 
avoid. 
In an earlier essay,
43 I argued that “dependence corruption” was distinct 
from equality as a matter of logic. The point can be seen in a simple Venn 
diagram: 
 
 
39. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). In Austin, the Court upheld a prohibition on corporations using 
treasury money to make independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections. The 
Court considered such expenditures a “different type of corruption.” Id. at 660. Hasen describes his 
argument in Is ‘Dependence Corruption’ Distinct, supra note 2, at 10–16. 
40. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 114 (2003). 
41. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
42. See  Robert C. Post, Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Prof. of Law, Yale L. Sch., 
Representative Democracy: The Constitutional Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, Lecture Series 
at the Harvard Law Tanner Lectures on Human Values (May 1–3, 2013) (video available at 
http://mahindrahumanities.fas.harvard.edu/content/representative-democracy). 
43. Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, supra note 2. 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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While some measures to address “dependence corruption” might also 
address inequality (region B), some measures to address “dependence 
corruption” would not address inequality (region A); and some measures to 
address inequality would not address “dependence corruption” (region C). 
But the point can be made even stronger by extending the analysis: some 
efforts at addressing inequality could actually create “dependence corruption” 
(region D). 
To see this point, think about the Senate as it was originally constituted. 
Senators were selected by state legislatures. They were, in the sense of 
dependence I described above, to be “dependent upon the States.” Now 
imagine—as some states did—that some in the states decide that they want “the 
People” to choose the senators, not the state legislature. To that end, they 
successfully pass a referendum, forcing the legislature to vote as the people do 
in a popular election for Senate. That reform would plainly advance equality. 
But in the sense I’ve described, it would create “dependence corruption”—for 
now the dependence of the Senate is no longer the dependence intended by the 
Constitution. The Seventeenth Amendment changed that intended dependence. 
Before it did, popularly elected senators would have betrayed a kind of 
dependence corruption. 
But it is not just logic that distinguishes “dependence corruption” from 
equality. The distinction also flows from constitutional analysis. 
To see this point, distinguish between the influence of speech on a 
government official and the influence of speech on a citizen. When the state 
regulates the crime of bribery, its target is the influence of speech upon an 
official of the government (e.g.,  “If  you get the earmark, I’ll give you 
$100,000.”). But when Michigan regulated corporate speech, its target was the 
influence of such speech upon the citizens of Michigan (e.g., “Unions kill 
jobs.”). 
If there is one clear First Amendment principle that emerges from the 
Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence, it is that the government has 
no role in regulating the influence of speech on its citizens. It can’t “equalize” 
the effect of speech on citizens.
44  It can’t sanitize the effect  of speech on 
citizens.
45 It can’t take sides.
46 The government, the Court in effect has held, 
can’t intervene to protect the public from the effects of speech the government 
thinks the public needs to be protected from. The public must protect itself if, 
indeed, it needs to be protected. 
Just as clear is the principle that the government does have a role in 
regulating speech to protect the legitimate processes of the government. The 
government can protect secrets to assure the integrity of the government’s 
 
44. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010). 
45. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning state’s conviction of protester 
wearing “Fuck the Draft” shirt for disturbing the peace). 
46. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (limiting regulation of “hate speech”). 01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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work.
47 The government can regulate non-public forums to protect legitimate 
state interests.
48  It can even regulate public forums.
49  And it can regulate 
“corruption” to protect the integrity of the government policy-making process. 
The government can ban, in other words, the symbolic “speech” of paying a 
government official for a private favor, so as to . . . 
What? What is the reason the government has the power to restrict such 
symbolic speech? Though the Court has never explained it completely, the 
justification must tie to a conception of appropriate legislative behavior. 
Whatever else “representation” might mean, it cannot mean trading government 
favors either for private gain or directly for political gain. That trade is illegal.
50 
And even the speech to propose that trade is illegal. However much else might 
be contested about theories of representation, this much is not: the offer to 
exchange public good for private gain can be banned. 
Importantly for our purposes, it can be banned even if its effect is to level 
the playing field within politics. In a kleptocracy, the rich have more power 
than the poor. The effect of banning bribery or quid pro quo corruption within a 
kleptocracy would be to reduce the power of the rich relative to the poor. Its 
effect, in other words, would be to level the playing field. But at least within 
our constitutional tradition, the mere fact that one effect of corruption 
regulation is to level the playing field obviously cannot therefore render that 
regulation unconstitutional. For if it did, quid pro quo corruption could not be a 
crime.
51 
 
47. See, for example, the interest recognized in Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 
U.S. 829 (1978). 
48. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983). 
49. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
50. Though the reasons why are not fully explained. David Strauss has famously separated this 
disjunct between a quid pro quo for private benefit and a quid pro quo for a political benefit on the way 
to deconstructing the “only” reasons why a quid pro quo for a political benefit could be problematic. 
Such corruption is derivative, Strauss’s elegant argument holds, upon either a conception of equality, 
or a conception of the deliberative process. Strauss, supra note 36, at 1373. But even if Strauss’s 
argument is effective against quid pro quo corruption, it is not effective against “dependence 
corruption.” “Dependence corruption” is “corruption” because it reflects an improper, as in 
unintended, dependence. The impropriety is the corruption. The harm that corruption causes is the 
reason we might want to remedy it. But the harm—either to equality norms, or to deliberation—is not 
the corruption. 
51. Hasen acknowledges that “a campaign finance law justified on traditional anti-corruption 
grounds should not become unconstitutional if the law incidentally promotes political equality.” 
Hasen, Is ‘Dependent Corruption’ Distinct, supra note 2, at 6 (citation omitted). But he chides me for 
making the point by relying upon the notion that “votes are speech.” As he writes, “[Lessig seems 
unaware that] the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that voting has expressive value protected by 
the First Amendment, although it recently seemed to back off from a strict statement of this point.” Id. 
(citation omitted). But Hasen has confused First Amendment “coverage,” to follow Fred Schauer, and 
First Amendment “protection.” Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in 
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267 (1981). There’s no doubt the First Amendment “covers” the 
“expressive value” of voting. The question the Court has addressed is whether that covered speech gets 
the strongest First Amendment “protection.”  01-Lessig (Do Not Delete)  2/19/2014  12:46 PM 
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Thus, between these two paradigms—regulating speech that corrupts 
government officials (constitutional) and regulating speech said to corrupt 
citizens (unconstitutional)—where does concern about “dependence 
corruption” stand? Is it, as Hasen has argued, just another “political equality 
argument”?
52 Or is it instead a “corruption argument?” 
Between (a) laws meant to regulate the influence of speech on 
government officials, and (b) laws meant to regulate the influence of speech on 
citizens, “dependence corruption” is plainly in category (a). Its target is not the 
effect of speech on citizens. Its target is the effect of certain practices of 
fundraising on representatives. And whether regulating to eliminate 
“dependence corruption” is justified or not, it is not unjustified because it is the 
sort of speech that Austin said could be regulated. 
So while the Court may or may not choose to recognize the interest in 
eliminating “dependence corruption” as a compelling interest, if it did not, it 
should not be because “dependence corruption” is really “a political equality 
argument.” 
So should the Court recognize the interest in eliminating “dependence 
corruption” as a compelling interest, just as it recognizes the  interest in 
eliminating quid pro quo corruption, or the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption, as a compelling interest? 
In principle, yes, though it is important that the principle be properly 
cabined so that it is actually targeting “dependence corruption” within our 
constitutional tradition: “Dependence corruption” identifies improper 
dependence. But a “dependence” is only improper because of a conception of 
proper dependence. Within our constitutional tradition, that proper dependence 
is a “dependence on the people alone.” What kind of “dependence” then would 
conflict with a “dependence on the people alone”? 
Begin with one clear example: Imagine a state that wanted to assure that 
its members of Congress were sufficiently sensitive to federalism interests. So 
imagine it changed the way it selected the “Electors of the most numerous 
Branch of [its] State Legislature.”
53 Rather than the way every state does it 
today—a primary and a general election in which the electors are citizens 
eighteen and older—imagine a state instituted a “Federalism Primary” to select 
the candidates that were permitted to run in the general election for its state 
legislature. The electors in that “Federalism Primary” were the members of the 
state senate. The state senate, in other words, was the primary election that 
chose the candidates that could run in the general election. 
Under our Constitution, this change would also change the way that 
members of Congress from those states would be selected. Article I, Section 2 
specifies that “the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite 
 
52. Hasen, Is ‘Dependence Corruption’ Distinct, supra note 2, at 11. 
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for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” Those 
“Electors,” in this state, would not be citizens eighteen and older. They would 
instead be members of the state senate at one stage, and citizens eighteen and 
older at the other. 
That change may or may not be deemed unconstitutional. But if it were 
unconstitutional, one way to understand its unconstitutionality would be 
through the notion of “dependence corruption.” The Framers intended the 
House to be “dependent on the people alone.” They thought they would assure 
that dependence by tying the electors of members of Congress to the electors of 
the state legislature. But if a state narrowed those electors to ones who would 
advance the interests of the state first, then the state would have corrupted that 
intended dependence. We may or may not be stuck with that corruption; the 
Court may or may not believe the issue justiciable. But if it did reach the merits 
in such a case, this corruption would certainly justify the Court’s invalidating 
the state scheme. If anything is clear from The Federalist No. 52, it is that such 
a dependence would violate the purpose of a dependence “on the people alone.” 
The whole focus of Madison’s argument in The  Federalist  No.  52 is to 
distinguish the House from the Senate. A state that essentially filtered 
congressmen in the way the (original) Constitution permitted them to select 
senators would plainly violate the sense of “dependence on the people alone.” 
Would anything else violate that principle? Consider the “White Primary 
Cases” decided by the Supreme Court in the first half of the last century. In a 
“white primary” state, the primary election for the Democratic Party was 
limited to white Democrats only. At first the state did this directly.
54 When that 
was invalidated, the state did it indirectly, by delegating to private entities the 
right to conduct these primaries. That too was invalidated—even though the 
primary was not in any formal way a barrier to an individual running in the 
general election.
55  As in Lesterland, an aspiring representative didn’t 
necessarily need to win the white primary to win an election. But practically 
nobody who lost that primary ever won the general election. 
These cases were largely driven by the values of racial equality within the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. But the most interesting of these cases, 
United States v. Classic, is not grounded in race.
56 The issue in that case was 
whether the right of citizens to participate in the election of Congress could be 
limited to a general election only, or whether that right would include the right 
to participate in a primary as well—so that actions that interfered with the right 
 
54. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating law banning blacks from voting 
in Texas Democratic primary). 
55. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (invalidating the fully private club as primary); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (establishing Congress’s authority to regulate such 
private elections, even though victory in such primaries was neither necessary nor sufficient—
formally—to winning a general election). 
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to have votes properly counted in a primary election could be said to violate a 
criminal statute that protected the integrity of the vote. 
To decide that question, the Court first described the interpretive process 
that it would follow: 
We may assume that the framers of the Constitution in adopting that 
section [Article I, section 2], did not have specifically in mind the 
selection and elimination of candidates for Congress by the direct 
primary any more than they contemplated the application of the 
commerce clause to interstate telephone, telegraph and wireless 
communication, which are concededly within it. But in determining 
whether a provision of the Constitution applies to a new subject matter, 
it is of little significance that it is one with which the framers were not 
familiar. For in setting up an enduring framework of government they 
undertook to carry out for the indefinite future and in all the 
vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental 
purposes which the instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its 
words, not as we read legislative codes which are subject to continuous 
revision with the changing course of events, but as the revelation of the 
great purposes which were intended to be achieved by the Constitution 
as a continuing instrument of government.
57 
That “great purpose” then allowed the Court to conclude that the “first 
step” of this “two step” process would be subject to constitutional regulation 
too. 
Nor can we say that that choice which the Constitution protects is 
restricted to the second step because Section 4 of Article I, as a means 
of securing a free choice of representatives by the people, has 
authorized Congress to regulate the manner of elections, without 
making any mention of primary elections. For we think that the 
authority of Congress, given by Section 4, includes the authority to 
regulate primary elections when, as in this case, they are a step in the 
exercise by the people of their choice of representatives in Congress.
58 
Thus these elections—the “white primaries” that were effectively ended 
by  Terry v. Adams
59—present a similar question to the issue raised by 
Lesterland: How does restricting the first step of a two-step election process to 
a subset of “citizens” corrupt the election system? And independently of the 
rights secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the exclusion of 
blacks from the primary could plainly be said to be a corruption of a 
“dependence on the people alone.” 
In both cases—my hypothetical “Federalism Primary” and the decidedly 
not hypothetical “white primaries”—the improper dependence is improper 
because not every citizen could be a member of the filtering class. Maybe 
 
57. Id. at 315–16. 
58. Id. at 317. 
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anyone could be a member of the state senate, but at the time they make their 
decisions, only a small portion of the state is a member of the state senate. The 
dependence upon them means there is not a “dependence on the people alone.” 
That exclusion is clearer in the race-based cases: blacks cannot be white. So a 
regime that filters choices on the basis of whether someone is white or black is 
not a regime that creates a dependence “on the people alone.” 
Both cases point to the focus of the corruption that I am describing in this 
Essay: a system in which a tiny proportion of citizens are “the funders” within 
the money election. As with legislators, or with white primary voters, this too is 
“dependence corruption,” because this too is a dependence upon an influence 
that is not “the people alone.” Only a tiny proportion of “the people” could 
afford the funding necessary to become “a funder.” That means, of necessity, 
that “the funders” cannot stand for “the people.” A dependence upon them thus 
violates the exclusivity requirement (“alone”) in “dependence on the people 
alone.” A dependence upon them is thus “corruption.” 
To say this, however, is not to say that any system that filters candidates is 
of necessity “corruption.” Obviously, primaries filter candidates. They are not 
corruption, however, because any citizen could qualify to participate in the 
primary process. 
And we could even imagine a more extreme pre-filtering process that 
would also not, on this analysis, constitute corruption. Imagine, following the 
work on “deliberative polling” by Professor James Fishkin,
60 that a state were 
to select a random and representative selection of citizens, and charge them 
with selecting among the candidates those who could run in a general election. 
In this case, there would be a dependence, as in Lesterland, upon a tiny slice of 
citizens. But by design, there would in that case be a plausible basis upon 
which to conclude that the filtering electors represent “the People.” Anyone 
could have been selected; the body that is in fact selected is selected to assure it 
represents everyone. And though a filter of legislators might also be seen to be 
similarly representative (if “the People” selected them), legislators once in 
office have an interest that is distinct from the interests represented by “the 
People.” The Fishkin jury, by contrast, does not sit within an office. 
To summarize: the essence of “dependence corruption” is a competing 
dependence that conflicts with an intended dependence. A competing 
dependence upon legislators, or upon white voters, would be such a corruption. 
A competing dependence upon a representative sample of citizens, by contrast, 
need not  be such a corruption. It follows, as I’ve already described, that a 
dependence upon “the funders,” when those funders constitute such a tiny slice 
of a concentrated interest, is also “dependence corruption.” 
From that originalist perspective, then, the Court could well recognize a 
compelling interest in remedying “dependence corruption,” as it has recognized 
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a compelling interest in remedying quid pro quo corruption. As I will describe 
more below, that compelling interest would obviously support public funding 
systems that would eliminate that “dependence corruption.” It would plainly 
justify aggregate contribution limits.
61  It might also support restrictions on 
speech that could not otherwise be justified by reference to quid pro quo 
corruption. 
IV. 
BUT SHOULD ORIGINAL VIEWS MATTER? 
It is a fact about campaign finance reformers that many are politically 
liberal. It is an unfortunate fact about liberals that most reject arguments 
grounded in “originalism.”
62 Thus for many of my liberal friends, when I say 
that the Framers would have understood “dependence corruption” as 
“corruption” the response is “eeew.” And when I say that only a non-originalist 
could insist that “corruption” means quid pro quo corruption only, many of my 
liberal friends say,  “see, that’s why we need to appeal to equality.” Their 
assumption, like the non-originalist, is that “corruption” here can’t help. 
But I am, and have always been, an originalist, even if my flavor of 
originalism isn’t immediately obvious to all within that school of interpretive 
theory.
63 So I advance the argument that I have here not just because there is a 
majority on the Supreme Court which calls itself “originalist.” I advance it 
because I believe it is right to affirm the essential premise of originalism: that 
the authority to negate what Congress does must be grounded either in clear 
text, or in a proper and clear understanding of the original meaning of that text. 
Nothing is clear about history, of course, but an originalism of integrity 
works with integrity to understand the framework of the (relevant) Framers, 
and, in my view, to render it today in a way that preserves its original meaning. 
If the Framers were focused  on anything, it was upon how best to craft a 
republic that was properly dependent upon the people. Properly dependent 
means not a direct democracy. A republic, for the Framers, had to be a 
representative democracy. And not every institution within our Republic must 
be “dependent on the people.” The courts, for example, were dependent on the 
law. But for some institutions within our Republic, a proper dependence meant 
a “dependence on the people alone.” 
There is a lot of room for debate about what a proper dependence in that 
sense would mean. But there are also cases which should present no real 
debate. If the state of Rhode Island gave the queen of England the right to 
 
61. This is the issue raised in McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), prob. 
juris. noted, 133 S. Ct. 1242 (2013). 
62. Most, though not all. See Jack Balkin’s masterful book, Living Originalism. JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
63. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 
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choose the candidates among whom we the People could select,
64 that would be 
an improper dependence—not because she’s not smart, or wise, but because 
whatever “the People” means, it cannot mean the queen of England. 
And likewise it cannot mean “the Lesters”—or more precisely, “the 
Funders”—of campaigns as our campaigns are now funded. That dependence 
too is improper because, as with the queen of England, the vast majority of the 
people could not possibly be “funders.” We all could be Democrats, or 
Republicans. There’s nothing logical or practical that bars us from a 
Democratic or Republican primary. But we could not all be the relevant 
“funders,” for to qualify for that status requires a commitment of resources 
significantly beyond the reach of the vast majority of electors. So, adapting the 
Court’s reasoning in Classic, we might say, 
We may assume that the framers of the Constitution in adopting that 
section, did not have specifically in mind the selection and elimination 
of candidates for Congress by the [money] primary any more than they 
contemplated the application of the commerce clause to interstate 
telephone, telegraph and wireless communication which are 
concededly within it. But in determining whether a provision of the 
Constitution applies to a new subject matter, it is of little significance 
that it is one with which the framers were not familiar.
65 
The Framers were not focused on “the Lesters.” For dependence upon 
“the Lesters” had not manifested itself because at the Framing there were not 
yet  what we would see as campaigns. But they were focused upon other 
dependencies that might similarly draw the attention of Congress from a 
“dependence on the people alone.” And nothing they were focused upon is 
remotely as significant as the corruption that “the Funders” today have effected 
upon the exclusive dependence our Republic was to have “on the people 
alone.” 
V. 
HOW “DEPENDENCE CORRUPTION” WOULD MATTER JURISPRUDENTIALLY 
If the Court recognized “dependence corruption” as the sort of corruption 
that the state would have a compelling interest to remedy, little in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence (as opposed to cases applying Supreme Court 
jurisprudence) would change. 
“Dependence corruption” would not revive Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce. As Hasen rightly argued, the real interest advanced in that case 
was equality; the aim of the law justified by that concern for equality was to 
protect the citizens of Michigan from the so-called “corrupting” influence of 
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unequal speech. “Dependence corruption” has nothing to do with protecting the 
people from allegedly “corrupting” speech. Its aim is  instead to protect a 
legislative process from a corrupting dependency. 
“Dependence corruption” would also not reverse Citizens United v. FEC. 
The issue in that case was a ban on independent expenditures by corporations. 
Expenditures affect how people view political contests. The First Amendment 
does not permit the government to regulate how people view political contests. 
And “dependence corruption” is likewise not concerned about how people view 
political contests. 
“Dependence corruption” would, however, be critically relevant to 
whether aggregate limits on total contributions to candidates and parties are 
constitutional.
66 It is hard to see those limits as related to “corruption” in the 
quid pro quo sense. But it is easy to see those limits related to “dependence 
corruption.” As evidence relied upon by the Supreme Court of  Montana 
demonstrates, removing limits reduces the number of contributors.
67  A 
reduction in the number of contributors would only increase the “dependence 
corruption” within this system. 
And perhaps most significantly, “dependence corruption” would matter to 
a decision by the D.C. Circuit, unreviewed by the Supreme Court: 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC.
68 
The issue in SpeechNow was not, as in Citizens United, expenditures. The 
issue was contributions. Federal law limited the maximum contribution to an 
independent political action committee to the limit for traditional political 
action committees. That limit was challenged. The reasoning in that challenge 
is superficially compelling: if Citizens United says independent expenditures 
can’t be limited, then so too, the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit goes, must there 
be no limits on contributions to independent political action committees. 
But that conclusion does not follow. As the Court said in Citizens United, 
“an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate.”
69 
A contribution is not “speech presented to the electorate.” A contribution is 
money given to a coordinating body. And while the Court did not find credible 
evidence in the Citizens United record of “any direct examples of votes being 
exchanged for . . . expenditures,” which “confirm[ed] Buckley’s reasoning that 
independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro 
quo corruption,”
70  there was no evidence presented about the effects of 
contributions to political action committees upon the behavior of candidates. 
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My claim is not that such contributions necessarily demonstrate 
corruption—either quid pro quo or “dependence corruption.”  It is instead 
simply that the factual basis for concluding that there is no corruption has not 
been established. Citizens United (inconsistently, perhaps) was explicit that it 
was in theory open to the evidence about the relationship between expenditures 
and quid pro quo corruption. As the Court wrote, 
When Congress finds that a problem exists, we must give that finding 
due deference. If elected officials succumb to improper influences 
from independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; 
and if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause 
for concern. We must give weight to attempts by Congress to seek to 
dispel either the appearance or the reality of these influences.
71 
That openness in turn must require a court to at least examine whether 
there would be evidence of corruption flowing from contributions to a Super 
PAC. And the experience of the last election provides ample evidence of 
“dependence corruption,” and maybe even quid pro quo corruption. 
I described in my book, One Way Forward (2012), the most compelling 
testimony I had heard about this kind of corruption. Former Senator Evan Bayh 
(D-Ind.) had been challenged during a television show to demonstrate exactly 
how Citizens United had affected the political process. Bayh rolled his eyes in 
response to the question, and as I described his answer: 
The single most frightening prospect that an incumbent now faces is 
that, thirty days before an election, some anonymously funded super 
PAC will drop $500,000 to $1,000,000 in attack ads in the district. 
When that happens, the incumbent needs a way to respond. He can’t 
turn to his largest contributors—by definition, they have all maxed out 
and can’t, under the law, give any more. So the only protection he can 
buy is from super PACs on his own side. 
That protection, however, must be secured in advance—a kind of 
insurance, the premium for which must be paid before a claim gets 
filed. And so how do you pay your premium to a super PAC on your 
side in advance? By conforming your behavior to the standards set by 
the super PAC. “We’d love to be there for you, Senator, but our charter 
requires that we only support people who have achieved an 80 percent 
or better grade on our Congressional Report Card.” And so the rational 
senator has a clear goal—80 percent or better—that he works to meet 
long before he actually needs anyone’s money. And thus, without even 
spending a dollar, the super PAC achieves its objective: bending 
congressmen to its program. It is a dynamic that would be obvious to 
Tony Soprano or Michael Corleone but that is sometimes obscure to 
political scientists.
72 
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Bayh is describing a dynamic. That description alone doesn’t establish 
that the dynamic is significant, or significant enough to justify regulation. But 
the point is that the dynamic shows precisely how unlimited contributions to a 
Super PAC might indeed facilitate “dependence corruption.” For if Super PACs 
become dominant within the political system, then candidates become 
dependent upon them. And even if they can’t coordinate directly with their 
expenditures, there are plenty of ways they can coordinate and encourage their 
fundraising. That fundraising in turn is not $100-a-person fundraising. That 
fundraising is, instead, from the Lesters. 
With the proper showing, then, “dependence corruption” gives us a way to 
see why Citizens United might be correct—to the extent it nullifies regulations 
that limit the ability of “people” to speak to citizens—but why the implications 
that many have drawn from Citizens United are not necessarily correct. Citizens 
United might mean there is nothing Congress can do to silence George Soros or 
the Koch brothers. But there may be something Congress could do to limit the 
contributions made to Super PACs. Contributions trigger a corruption analysis 
(since they could evince the wrong kind of dependence), even if expenditures 
would not. Under a corruption analysis, limits on contributions designed to 
reduce a competing, and hence improper, dependence could be upheld, even if 
limitations on expenditures would not. 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers gave us, as Ben Franklin quipped, “a Republic, if [we] can 
keep it.”
73 If a republic is a representative democracy, and if that representative 
democracy is to be “dependent on the people alone,” then we have not kept it. 
We have lost it. And with it, we have also lost the capacity to govern. 
The First Amendment makes it difficult to restore that intended 
dependence. But it does not make it impossible. An originalist understanding of 
“corruption” shows  just how limits on contributions to political action 
committees, whether independent or not, can be sustained, even if regulations 
of expenditures by those political action committees cannot. An originalist 
understanding of “corruption” also supports the idea of aggregate contribution 
limits—so as to increase the number of “funders.” Finally, an originalist 
understanding of “corruption” offers the clearest legitimate state interest for 
systems of public funding. Those systems are not necessarily intended to level 
the playing field. They are instead intended to avoid candidates developing an 
improper dependence. 
Though in my view the biggest concern is with Congress, the nature of 
this improper dependence is illuminated well with a single contrast from the 
most recent presidential campaign: In his 2012 reelection campaign, Barack 
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Obama attended 222 fundraisers. By contrast, in 1984, Ronald Reagan held not 
a single fundraiser.
74 The reason for the difference was public funding. Reagan 
benefited more from public funding than any other president in U.S. history, 
financing three national elections on the public fisc; Obama had withdrawn 
from public funding in 2008, making him the first President since Nixon to be 
elected with private money only.
75 
But for our purposes, the salient difference between these two candidates 
is just the practical experience of that fundraising. What does it do to a 
candidate to spend so much time trying to persuade such a tiny fraction of 
America? Indeed, in the Republican primary in 2012, many Republicans were 
frustrated by the amount of time candidates spent in “blue states.” But as Willie 
Sutton is said to have put it, that’s where the money was, so that’s where their 
attention remained.
76 
That attention reveals a dependence. When predicated of Congress, that 
dependence conflicts with the dependence intended by our Framers. There is 
nothing in the history of the First Amendment that suggests that it was meant to 
block Congress’s ability to secure its proper dependence. There is likewise 
nothing in the logic of Buckley or Citizens United that should disable the Court 
from recognizing Congress’s power to secure that dependence. 
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